There are several points to which I would like to reply in John Corner's insightful commentary piece on my EJC article dealing with the 'propaganda model' of media operations laid out and applied by Herman and Chomsky (1988, 2002) in their book, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media.
assumptions of the propaganda model highly attractive, and this is precisely attributable to the relative ease with which its first-order predictions may be tested empirically vis-a-vis consideration of 'paired examples' and 'boundaries of the expressible' in media discourse (see Klaehn, 2002b: 168) .
Generally speaking, any given model within the social sciences is inspired by the search for truth and comprises sets of elaborated arguments. Perceived strengths and limitations of various perspectives can in part be gleaned by the extent to which corresponding evidence suggests that the particular hypotheses advanced are accurate and/or intuitively plausible and serve some utility in explaining and understanding recurring, empirically specifiable patterns.
Regarding the question of whether or not the propaganda model constitutes a 'theory' of media/state/market relations, suffice to say that the conception of social organization upon which the foundations of the model are constructed are perfectly in keeping with the structuralconflict perspective within sociology. It predicts a correlation between patterns of media behaviour and broader institutional and market imperatives. In doing so, it advances numerous hypotheses, which can be tested empirically, utilizing the methodological techniques associated with the model (see Klaehn, 2002b: 165-70) . Towards this end, evidence supportive of the predictions advanced by the model can be seen to lend significant legitimacy to its preferred theoretic/conceptual explanations, regarding interrelations of state, corporate capitalism and the corporate media. If concerned simply with the social scientific utility of the framework in question, the argument holds together quite nicely.
On the questions of closure
Referring to the five filters laid out in the first chapter of Manufacturing Consent, Corner states that the propaganda model projects what can be seen to be 'a totalizing and finalizing view' (closure). As noted in my original EJC article, the model assumes that the various dynamics highlighted by the five filter mechanisms have a range of powerful effects and are extensive in their overall reach and resiliency (see Klaehn, 2002b: 172) . The model does not predict that the filter mechanisms 'function without much if any need for further specification or qualification' (Corner). As noted in my original piece, the model outlines circumstances under which media will be relatively 'open' or 'closed' (see Klaehn, 2002b: 150) . The various predictions are clearly oriented towards a structural, free market analysis, and avail themselves only to a consideration of actual media coverage. Concurrently, the model does not imply that media are a 'solid monolith on all issues' (Herman and Chomsky, 1988 : xiii, as cited in Klaehn, 2002b: 171) . It cedes ideological gaps, acknowledges that the dynamics of the 'system' are sufficiently complex to preclude finalizing closure of the sort Corner seems to be eluding to (see Klaehn, 2002b: 172) . That is, the propaganda model makes no such prediction(s) which project a totalizing and/or finalizing view (see also, Klaehn, forthcoming) .
To be very clear, the propaganda model does not cast media audiences as passive victims of systematic ideological control and domination. Indeed Chomsky (1997) speaks at length about dissent culture in his book Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda. Similarly, the programme of 'intellectual self-defense', discussed at length by Chomsky (1989) in Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies, was highlighted in my original EJC article. The view of human agency invoked by such discussion fundamentally rejects a totalizing and finalizing view of the various hegemonic processes towards which the model's substantive hypotheses and explanatory powers are squarely aimed. Concurrently, as highlighted throughout, the programme of enquiry advanced by the model is designed to focus exclusively on actual media coverage. The empirical focus is on structured output. As Corner correctly observes, the model projects a view of media as firmly situated within a system of social inequality. Corner's remarks concerning the model's predictions, however, are mistaken and his criticisms in this regard seem to be based on a misreading of the model.
On subjectivity and consciousness
The propaganda model does not theorize audience effects, nor does it make predictions concerning agency and/or subjectivity. Rather, it highlights the fact that awareness, perception and understandings are typically constrained and informed by structures of discourse. This is a relatively uncontroversial premise, and one to which the whole field of discourse analysis is devoted. The model may be criticized from an 'effects' or reception perspective but such critique(s) should also clearly acknowledge that the model does not theorize effects nor does it make predictions concerning reception. Critique aimed at the way in which the public is positioned within the model's framework seems to be motivated by the unrealistic expectation that the propaganda model should explain everything, in every context.
It bears noting in translation that one could have the same expectation of virtually every theoretical framework within mainstream sociology. Of course, then, one would apparently have reason to dismiss all of the major paradigms or schools of thought in one fell swoop. Classical conflict theory, structural-functionalism, feminist theory, social constructionism, ethnomethodology, critical realism: each has limitations.
No one perspective or optic can be seen to adequately capture and/or account for the complexity of social reality. Each optic has specific areas of focus, each is associated with certain assumptions, and each has various 'blind spots' that have been identified, discussed, utilized in furthering the existent body of theoretic literature. The various perspectives taken together form the basis of a rich body of theory distinguished by its multiplicity of emphasis and focus. Should the propaganda model be held to what can be seen to be a higher standard than virtually every other conceptual model within the social sciences? That is, should the applications and corresponding limitations clearly laid out by its formulators be taken as not enough? And then, if so, on what basis, precisely?
Regarding various comments attributable to Chomsky concerning professionalism as ideology as well as ideologized spectrums of opinion, suffice to say that a range of existent literature takes up these matters (Klaehn, 2002a: 306; Winter, 1992 Winter, , 1998 Winter, , 2002 Kellner, 1995; Lee and Solomon, 1990; McMurtry, 1998; Smythe, 1978; Said, 1981; Nelson, 1989; Herman, 1995; also see, Klaehn, forthcoming) . To what degree can divergences and commonalties be seen between the essence of these various general statements on ideological inflection and the conceptual argument advanced by Marx and Engels in the section of The German Ideology titled 'Concerning the Production of Consciousness'? Further, the assumption that commonsense ideas are ideologically inflected is germane to virtually every school of thought within the discipline of mainstream sociology. It is perfectly fine to emphasize the fact that Chomsky has used such words as 'indoctrination', 'brainwashing' and 'thought control'. To my mind it seems important not to do so at the expense of momentarily neglecting and/or diverting attention away from the propaganda model's actual programme of empirical enquiry and/or predictions. And, as clearly highlighted in my original piece, since the model does not in any way cast actors as akin to 'cultural dopes' (as Corner seems to be implicitly implying, particularly in his strongly stated conclusion), it hardly seems strange or ironic that Chomsky would cite opinion polls as one of the reasons why the model should be included in scholarly debates on patterns of media performance. Again, it seems important to avoid mischaracterizing the model and its predictions.
Theorists have scrutinized, commented upon and problematized fundamental assumptions underlying various conceptual perspectives across the range of disciplines. Cultural studies generally has challenged traditional political-economic analysis of media (see Curran and Seaton, 1985: Fiske, 1987; Turner, 1990; Grossberg et al., 1991; Sherwood et al., 1993; Doyle et al., 1997) . To my mind, the utility of the propaganda model is not lessened because it does not make elaborate predictions which can be empirically tested concerning relationship and process. This is not what the model was designed to do, not what its formulators were concerned to address/theorize. I take these matters up once again in some considerable detail elsewhere (see Klaehn, forthcoming) .
Brief comments on various other matters
I am unsure how it is that the propaganda model should be characterized as a 'radical critique' (Corner) given that the fundamental assumptions which underlie its overall conceptual framework are so thoroughly wedded to the system of social organization imagined by classical Marxian theory.
If it is indeed true that a model which highlights structural elements is to be viewed as a 'shock' (Corner), then perhaps complacency and ideologized spectrums of opinion within the broader intellectual culture are additional facets of the discussion demanding reflection.
On the extent to which critical perspectives conceptually confront how the interrelations of state, market and ideology constrain democracy, it is imperative to theorize the operation of power in relation to dominant structural elements. Towards this end, the propaganda model offers an attractive analytical framework, one that is oriented towards empirical research.
